The ethics of superrealism and depiction of virtual humans in immersive technologies
Introduction
The following paper will talk about ethical aspects of the issue of superrealism and the representation of virtual humans in immersive technologies. The argument will be based largely on the paper by Slater et al. The Ethics of Realism in Virtual and Augmented Reality (2020) and thoroughly describe the possible threats of superrealism implementation. It will later consider approaches of Sven Nyholm (2020) and Peter Paul Verbeek (2006), which can be used to support the analysis of ethical implications of superrealism and its impact on human beings.
Superrealism and the representation of virtual humans
In their paper, Slater et al. (2020) raise the issue of superrealism in extended reality (XR) technologies — a collective term for virtual (VR), augmented (AR), and mixed reality (MR) (Ratcliffe et al., 2021). One of the main feelings accompanying the participants of XR, and the feeling differentiating the virtual experience from, e.g. playing a computer game, is ‘embodiment’, or feeling like the virtual avatar is actually one’s own, physical body (Heller, 2021). It is claimed it is increasingly likely that superrealism will become available in the near future, especially the very high quality visual and behavioural realism of virtual humans (Slater et al., 2020).
Superrealism is achieved through high-quality sensory feedback, so advanced that it becomes indistinguishable from reality. While visual stimulation and sound rendering is already nearing the highest level of realism, there is still a long way to go with olfactory cues and haptic rendering. Experiences like handshakes or, more forceful, pushing and hitting, would require extremely advanced robotic devices which, according to Slater et al. (2020), will not be available in the near future. Superrealism of humans cannot be, however, based only on the highest quality sensory input and synchronisation. Apart from looking real, the avatars must also behave in realistic manner. This includes facial expressions, gestures, and eye and body movements. The virtual characters must appear to see and look at the human participant, and be able to engage in all sorts of interactions.
One of the biggest problems with immersing oneself in the virtual reality is the device-gap (Slater et al., 2020). The virtual world is, and will likely still be in the future, displayed through a head-mounted device. Moreover, the image cannot be experienced in a resolution anywhere near the natural vision. The act of donning a device — which is in fact the border between real and virtual — makes it challenging to convince the participant that the world in VR is real, unless they are somehow persuaded to forget they are wearing the device. AR, on the other hand, has a chance to overcome the device-gap since the real world is merged with the virtual content and, in the future, there might be a possibility to make the AR devices ubiquitous and wearable for long periods.
Although it is not likely that in the foreseeable future people are going to truly believe that what they see in the virtual world is real (physical realism), it is important to note that they will, and already do, respond realistically to events and situations happening in the virtual setting. This, with high-quality visual traits and an ability to interact with virtual elements, might result in an intensified sensation that what is happening in the virtual environment could be happening in reality (psychological realism) (Slater et al., 2020).
Ethical problems of superrealism
Slater et al. (2020) outlined their speculations over worst case ethical problems of superrealism in order to highlight the necessity for further research. The examples include, among others, identity hacking (e.g. identity theft through making virtual copies of exiting humans), an increase of the collection and use of personal data (in order to improve the realism) and the control over the immersive technology system (i.e. question whether the system creators have the possibility to manipulate the sensory experiences of its participants).
One of the most curious ethical issues concerning superrealism is the illusion of place and plausibility. Thanks to high-quality visuals and sensorimotor contingencies (the ability to perceive in a similar way to perceiving everyday reality through using one’s body), as well as ‘personalised’ virtual experience (i.e. offering events directed personally at the participant, e.g. receiving a smile from a virtual character), not only will the participants experience themselves being in a place depicted digitally, but also through experiencing events that could be happening personally to them they will see the virtual scenario as plausible. These are, respectively, illusion of place and illusion of plausibility, both making the participants ask, ‘is it real?’ (Slater et al., 2020).
It is not difficult to imagine the negative outcomes connected to these illusions. Participants might experience an uncertainty of current and past events and fail to distinguish between events that happened in XR and those which happened for real. This could cause mistrust towards events which actually occur in the real world. The illusion of place might lead participants to physically harm themselves through being ‘over-immersed’ in the virtual world (e.g. by trying to dive into a swimming pool after seeing virtual humans do it). One of the most unsettling negative outcomes, though, is the possible difficulty connected to transitioning from the virtual to the real world. After intense, emotional experiences in XR (both positive and negative), re-entering a very different (real) world requires a period of adjustment. It might mean having to mentally process difficult events that happened in the virtual setting (e.g. being insulted by a virtual avatar or witnessing death), with the fact that one’s real body is, for instance, less powerful than the one in XR (which in extreme cases might lead to body neglect), or with confusion connected to whether behaviours accepted in XR are also socially acceptable in the real world (Slater et al., 2020).
The possible impact of superrealism on human psychology is enormous and requires urgent ethical considerations. Participants might develop a preference for virtual social interactions, as these might seem more enjoyable and effortless, which in a dark scenario might eventually lead society to never meet face-to-face. This is likely to apply to and affect also sexual relations, given that VR sex content is already gaining interest. Further, people will likely be exposed to realistic pornography, violence and horror scenes which they did not expect to see, and which might result both in a post-traumatic stress and even desensitisation for obscenity and atrocity. These outcomes will likely have a detrimental effect on the whole society (Slater et al., 2020).
Treating virtual humans with dignity
An approach which can support an ethical analysis of superrealism is presented in Sven Nyholm’s book Humans and Robots. Ethics, Agency and Anthropomorphism (2020). The scholar explains a Kant-inspired approach towards ways of treating humanoid robots. Specifically, Nyholm talks about negative consequences of cruel and unworthy behaviours directed at those. Through adapting Kant’s views, which were originally related to animal cruelty, it can be concluded that such behaviours might corrupt a person’s character and make them act in the same way toward human beings.
Nyholm (2020) applies this to, among others, sex robots and gives examples of their use and relevant ethical implications. It can be understood that, if one was to follow Kant’s principles, regardless of the level of design and AI advancement of the robot, as long as it has human appearance, it deserves to be treated with dignity. Therefore, it could be considered ethically questionable to perform, for instance, simulated acts of rape on this sex robot, as it would be an act expressing lack of respect for the humanity in human beings. Additionally, it is pointed out that bad treatment of a sex robot can encourage objectification of one’s sex partner, particularly women. Interestingly, it would be on the other hand acceptable, in Kant-inspired point of view, to create loving and respectful relationships with sex robots (Nyholm, 2020).
Nyholm’s (2020) approach to treating human-like robots could be taken a step further and also concern behaviours directed at superrealistic, virtual humans. The philosopher proposes a Kantian principle which also applies to interactions with humanoid robots, which reads as follows: “Always treat the humanity in each person as an end in itself, and never as a means only — and out of respect for the humanity in each person, also treat the apparent humanity in any person (or robot!), never merely as a means, but always as an end in itself” (Nyholm, 2020). This statement could be adjusted by adding a claim about a virtual human. Adapting Nyholm-inspired principle and treating virtual humans with respect might help avoid the negative after-effects connected to superrealism. For instance, if the negative experiences, such as being insulted or witnessing death, are not created by other humans present in the virtual world, the troubles with dealing with traumatic experiences will be diminished.
However, there can be disputable cases which assume performing immoral acts on humans in virtual reality in order to avoid acting them out in real world. An example can be a person engaging in pedophilia in VR, which is a way of realising their unacceptable drives without harming anyone (Slater et al., 2020). Although the case is very complex and needs a broad analysis, it can be assumed that for Kant and Nyholm this would perhaps still be a disrespect for humanity. Even though it would mean saving real people from harm and pain.
Applying morality in XR
Another point of view, and possibly a way to work against detrimental effects of superrealism, is described by Verbeek in Materializing Morality. Design Ethics and Technological Mediation (2006). According to Verbeek (2006), designers of technologies should focus on both the tech’s functionalities and its mediating roles. Technologies always mediate human actions, and this makes designers responsible for anticipating the mediating roles. Thus, since technologies seem to be able to invite specific forms of action while being used, the work of a designer becomes, in fact, a moral activity. Through applying Verbeek’s views to the development of superrealism in XR, it can be concluded that it is possible to apply superrealism in a way that it promotes treating other, virtual humans with dignity, promotes moral actions and does not allow for, or does not afford, immoral acts.
To ensure ethical development of advanced immersive technology and superrealism, designers could support their design process with constructive technology assessment (CTA). This approach uses not only the designers’ imagination regarding future possible uses of the technology, but most importantly applies practicality into the design process. Verbeek (2006) says that CTA is based on performing a mediation analysis which is carried out not by the designers alone, but by all stakeholders. These stakeholders engage in a democratic debate over applying the outcomes of the analysis into the design process. This method, according to Verbeek (2006), could reduce the fear of creating deliberately behaviour-steering technologies. In case of superrealism, applying CTA might help to avoid some of the negative after-effects experienced by the virtual reality participants through applying moral values to the design. However, a question one might pose, and at the same time point out a limitation of this approach, is how the democratic character of the debate can be ensured and how to avoid the design being forced forward solely for profit reasons (omitting moral considerations).
Conclusion
The use of XR technologies is becoming increasingly widespread and starts to be applied in areas other than entertainment. The recent introduction of Metaverse is a global indicator that immersive technologies will in the coming years face rapid progress and, what goes with it, the development of superrealism. It is important, then, to start asking ethical questions now. This essay aimed to present dangers that superrealism will likely bring onto human beings and considered two philosophical approaches which support the ethical analysis of the technology. The discussion could be developed further and question whether it is worth, for the wellbeing of people, to develop such an influential technology, and try to answer why humans are drawn to creating superrealistic technologies, such as humanoid robots and virtual superrealism, in the first place.
References
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